

Eyewitness Report: 'A Frightful Reign of Terror' in Red China

Over Million and Half Believed Exterminated

By LEON DENNEN,
NEA Staff Writer.

MILAN, Italy, July 28.—A Chinese worker who fled the Red terror of his native land says the Communist regime kills or imprisons everyone it distrusts and exploits to the limit the people it trusts.

The worker is Wang Chung, who was a delegate to the Milan convention of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. His eyewitness account, one of the first ever to emerge from today's Red China, was given to the delegates.

Only a little more than a month ago, Wang was in China. He made his way out by disguising himself as a small-town peddler, contacting hide-outs of the resistance movement and eventually crawling over to the Hong Kong border under bristling barbed wire and Communist gunfire.

Working Hours Boosted to 16 a Day.

In pre-Communist China, he declares, the working hours were eight to nine a day. The Reds boosted them to 10 and 12. China's entry into the Korean War pushed them even higher, to a maximum of 16 a day. A skilled machinist, Wang describes his life:

"I remember that for months on end last winter I did not even have a chance to speak with my wife and kids. I was off for work at 6 in the morning when they were still in bed. I finished work at 9 at night, and immediately there was a two or three hour session in a group (political) meeting. When I returned at midnight the family was already sound asleep."

Wages were not increased proportionately with hours, he adds. Quite the reverse. In 1947 Wang drew 600 pounds a month. In 1948, he got 200 pounds for 16 hours. But even that was only the nominal pay. After deducting taxes, duties, and various "voluntary" contributions he took home from 100 to 150 pounds of rice a month.

Malnutrition, Industrial Fatigue Increase.

One hundred pounds of rice, says Wang, is barely enough for two bowls of very thin rice porridge per meal for each of the five in his family for a month.



The accompanying story on Red China points up the slave labor situation within the Soviet Union, which comprises one-sixth of the world's land surface. This map, based on latest estimates, with 14,000,000 under forced labor, pinpoints by hammer and sickle symbols the known slave labor areas administered by the GULAG, the Soviet slave labor trust.

Slave labor and long hours gave industrial production malnutrition and industrial fatigue which has greatly increased the frequency of industrial accidents. In Wang's machine shop, accidents were almost a daily occurrence.

Wang reports that Communist agents long ago wormed their way into every labor union and converted them all into "agencies of the secret police, which has brought to my country a frightful reign of terror."

The chief union aims now are to compile a black list of

slave laborers and to hold frequent mass meetings at which union leaders strike out names (marking men for death) when the list grows too long.

Adds Wang:

"I remember some of the meetings in which some of the resistance fellows were condemned to death with a great many innocent workers. Later on, when there were too many 'suspicious' elements, the Communist agents sent

Escaped Worker Tells Of Mounting Unrest

in the names to the secret police, who arrested them and shot them at will.

'I Used to Tremble at Night . . .'

"I used to tremble at night when police vans drove up to my doorstep, or when my neighbors' doors were knocked on in the small hours before dawn."

Wang recalls the Red regulation of Feb. 21, 1951, which gave legal sanction to the widespread purges and massacres that have caught the attention of the outside world. He says they were the Communist response to great popular discontent over China's participation in the Korean War.

He cites instances he knows about personally:

"A next door neighbor in Shanghai came from a village, and possessed about five acres of land. He was branded a landlord, an exploiter of the peasants, a man-eater in the countryside. . . . He was taken back to his village and buried alive before his family."

Wang says the Reds acknowledge having liquidated 1,500,000 anti-Communists, but that the number murdered is actually much greater and includes thousands of innocents.

Prefer War to Soviet Rule.

"Anyone found unco-operative in the slightest manner can be arrested and shot at any moment in any locality," he asserts.

After two years of these horrors, Wang reports his countrymen bitterly disillusioned.

"I'm sure I am voicing the unanimous opinion of my terror-stricken people when I say we prefer war to Soviet tyranny. In war there is hope for peace and freedom. In tyranny there can only be misery, poverty, and perpetual slavery."

"And so it transpires that millions of Chinese have again taken up arms and joined ranks with guerrilla units in the hills, around the lakes, along the coasts and in village hide-outs. . . . Hundreds of thousands of workers in factories and mines are in the resistance movement. . . . The day will not be far distant when the Chinese Iron Curtain will be smashed to pieces."

GUERRILLAS-

Our Hope in Red China



Guerrillas train on Formosa, less than 100 miles from China mainland. Gen. Sun Li-jen, VMI graduate, co-ordinates them with regular army MIKE JAMES

Communists seized the government through guerrilla warfare. Now their own tactics are being turned against them—by a half-million rebels who fight hard, but need U.S. aid

By ROBERT SHAPLEN

Hong Kong

NEWS slipping through Red China's Bamboo Curtain reveals that her rulers in Peking are increasingly concerned over an anti-Communist movement which already controls large areas of the mainland. They are especially worried because they themselves fought a long guerrilla war before they took over the country—and they know the possibilities of that kind of fighting.

But the Chinese guerrillas are worried too. They fear that unless outside aid is received in the next few months, their units will disintegrate.

This is the consensus of experienced political and military men—including Chinese, American, British and French officials with whom I talked—and of top guerrilla leaders whom I met secretly over a period of eight weeks in Taipei, Formosa, and here in Hong Kong.

Every one of these persons fervently expressed hope the guerrillas will be given a strong shot in the arm soon enough to keep going. Repeatedly, I heard two points emphasized: first, that unless we follow through on our brave stand against aggression in Korea and quickly help the guerrillas in China, we may well lose our best chance to gain real strategic advantage out of the prolonged Korean war; and, secondly, we may cause China's millions to lose for an indefinite time the opportu-

nity to rid themselves of their unpopular Red rulers.

"Unpopular" is a mild word.

Early this year, in the wake of some of the heaviest drains in taxation and man power the poor Chinese peasant has ever known, began one of the most ruthless purges the world has yet seen. It centered in the area south of the Yangtze River, where the Reds had less time than in the north to establish themselves before the Korean war began. But since the formal issuance, in February, of the Peking government's "Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries," the campaign to exterminate all enemies of the Red regime, actual and potential, has spread rapidly through the rest of the country.

Intelligence officials in Taipei and in Hong Kong, whose job it is to correlate and appraise the welter of mainland reports, estimate conservatively that at least half a million persons and probably closer to a million have been killed in China in the last year. Chou En-lai, Premier of Red China, has admitted more than a million guerrillas and saboteurs were slain in 20 months.

Intelligence officers of the Kuomintang (the political party now in control of the Nationalist government), which has established a good record

for correct information, have been able to identify 180,000 of these victims and to pinpoint the time and place of their murder. According to this same source, the Communists plan to eliminate some 500 persons in each of 2,087 districts into which they have divided China, plus at least 1,000 in each of 67 medium-size towns, and about 5,000 in each of the 12 biggest cities. This would bring the total marked for death to over a million, and there are many who believe that by the end of 1951 the figure will reach 2,000,000.

The Communists are even boasting about the success of their purge. Early in May, radio listeners in Hong Kong tuned in on Chinese-language broadcasts from nearby Canton describing the so-called "public trial" of 198 "counterrevolutionaries." After the frenzy of the crowd was whipped up, all 198 were executed. During the last two days of April, in preparation for what refugees here described as the May Day "peace campaign," 719 persons were killed, according to the Communists' own admission, in three key cities. Over a week's period, 24,000 were arrested in one of those cities alone, Shanghai.

And recently, the Kwantung Military District announced that a total of 196,000 "reactionaries" had been "dealt with" during 1950 in the three key

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southern provinces of Fukien, Kwangsi and Kwantung. Generally, in such over-all purge announcements, the Reds claim that most of those concerned either "surrendered," "reformed themselves" or "were captured"; but each week the Communist press also announces the execution of scores of individuals, about 10 per cent of whom are identified by name as "examples" and others simply listed as "secret agents," "tyrannical landlords" and such.

These definitions are broadly, but systematically, applied to anyone who has ever had any association with the old Kuomintang government, however indirect or remote in time. Individuals are often executed for political crimes allegedly committed 20 years ago.

This mass effort of the Reds to stamp out any and all opposition is being aimed particularly at an amorphous army of rebellion—the anti-Communist guerrillas. Some 500,000 of these guerrillas are operating in China today. They are loosely organized and they have a weird conglomeration of weapons, mostly old rifles. But they have the active secret support of another million Chinese peasants, and the potential backing of many millions more.

In announcing the new stringent control measures in February, Peng Cheng, deputy chairman of the Political and Law Committee of the Administrative Council, admitted that China's new guerrillas were achieving success. "In many places," he declared, "incidents have taken place in which railways and bridges were destroyed, factories and mines were damaged, warehouses set ablaze, and cadres were murdered..." With typically specious Red bravado, Peng went on: "If we do not thoroughly destroy the people's enemy, there cannot be a people's victory. To be lenient and magnanimous... is to be cruel to the people."

Despite the Red "antibandit" drive, the guerrillas have been striking back at the Communists whenever and wherever they can, always under the harshest handicaps. Its order of battle is opportunistic. The Korean war at first presented it with its greatest opportunity as the Reds siphoned off their finest troops to the north and fell back on ill-trained local soldiers and hastily conscripted political cadres to guard and control the south. But the worm has begun to turn.

Handicapped by Critical Shortages

Now the Communists' repression campaign is slowly eating away at the guerrilla movement, destroying or splitting parts of it and forcing other elements to lie low in a state of virtual blockade. The guerrillas' most serious problem is a shortage of guns and ammunition, which keeps them from striking back. General Pai Chung-hsi, former Minister of National Defense, who is currently one of Chiang Kai-shek's top strategy advisers, told me in Taipei: "The ammunition that was left on the mainland at the time of the Kuomintang retreats is just about exhausted. The Communists have confiscated what the guerrillas didn't manage to hide in the hills. The situation has become critical."

Another of Chiang Kai-shek's foremost advisers, onetime Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh, always one of the most respected and popular members of the Kuomintang inner council, put it this way: "In the long run, the guerrillas could spell the difference between victory and defeat. At present, if kept strong, they could certainly delay and impede Communist consolidation of the south. And when the mainland eventually is attacked, they could be both an invaluable screen and a concomitant offensive force."

What can be done to aid the guerrillas?

Although the new \$50,000,000 program of American military aid to the Chinese Nationalists is designed solely to fortify the defenses of Formosa, the guerrillas in their mainland hide-outs have undoubtedly taken heart from it.

It remains to be seen how much and how soon they will actually benefit from any possible by-products. Nationalist commanders, whose bases I visited, pointed out that when fresh weapons begin to arrive from the United States, it should become possible to release to the guerrillas some guns now being used by Kuomintang soldiers-in-training. These present Kuomintang arms are as much of an odd assortment as the guerrillas' own hodgepodge "arsenals," but they would nonetheless be eagerly

welcomed on the mainland, along with some of the 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition manufactured in Formosa each month.

But, again, the time factor is essential. Most of the guerrillas I spoke to said flatly they needed direct help at once to stave off their Communist oppressors and survive. And what they want, in addition to arms and ammo and communications equipment, their chief requirements, is a training base of their own and a sense of their own identity. Colonel Chang Hsi-ming, a famous woman guerrilla leader near Shanghai, who came to Taipei to beg aid, told me: "Some of us have been fighting for eight years against the Communists, and we still have no real standing, no credentials. We want some status, some assurance that when the fight is over we will not be ignored."

Many Seek Leadership in Formosa

Because Formosa has so far represented the only focal point to which they could turn, many guerrilla leaders who privately hope for a "new force" in the future have been going there, seeking help and advice. As many others have been struggling along as real standing, no credentials. We want some status, some assurance that when the fight is over we will not be ignored."

But they all stress the need for a central headquarters under a unified tactical command. Supplies could then be smuggled to them with some regularity by junk or, in certain areas, dropped by plane. Eventually, both General Pai and Dr. Wang added, it should become possible to establish a ring of secret supply centers around China, in South Korea, Indochina and Siam.

"Students" at the envisaged guerrilla school would include present and potential guerrillas now on the mainland, who would slip out and later be filtered back, and others chosen from among the many millions of anti-Communist Chinese now on Formosa and elsewhere in southeast Asia. The "faculty" would be primarily Sino-American. Admittedly, one of the hardest jobs would be to give form and unity to those guerrillas operating on the mainland. Without being for anything, many of them are simply against the Communists, and as one underground leader in Hong Kong sharply reminded me, "A guerrilla force without political leadership is banditry."

China's guerrillas today include an odd assortment of folk whose sole common bond is often salvation—wild tribesmen from the southwest hills, intrepid Mongolian horsemen, Kazakhs from the deep northwest interior, veteran pirates from the South Seas, but, above all, embittered peasant-soldiers from the rice paddies. In general, however, the guerrillas are of five types:

1—Former Kuomintang soldiers who stayed behind, either voluntarily or on orders, to fight the Communists. (There are also some former Nationalist troops who defected to the Reds and have since "re-defected.")

2—Ex-members of the old local militias, known under the Kuomintang as Peace Preservation Corps.

3—Civilians, mostly individual peasants and workers but sometimes whole villages, who provide "cover" for armed guerrillas by affording them three basic necessities—food, shelter and intelligence—and who conduct programs of passive resistance against the Reds whenever they can.

4—Religious and tribal groups, such as Moslems and Mongolians, mostly operating in remote areas, and members of semireligious secret societies. The latter have always played an important role in China and have recently become actively anti-Communist.

5—Bandits, who sometimes co-operate with other guerrilla groups but usually act on their own.

The Ministry of National Defense on Formosa officially claims 1,975,000 active guerrillas, broken down into 300 individual units of varying size and strength. Neutral observers, however, consider these figures high. Nor are the Ministry's claims of control over the bulk of guerrillas accepted. Taipei headquarters maintains contact by radio or courier with a few hundred thousand, mostly in the south and southwest, but it's doubtful that even half the guerrillas in China at present willingly acknowledge the leadership of the Kuomintang, whose prestige in large areas of the mainland remains low despite the new disillusion with Communism.

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Collier's for July 21, 1951



Three rebel chiefs: Gen. Yuen; Col. Chang, a woman who commands 4,000 men; Gen. Chen



Lt. Gen. Chen Kai-min (L) talks land-sea guerrilla strategy with Admiral Soong Ngo

Guerrilla chieftain Huang Pa-mei, known as "Two-Gun Moll," goes over reports with aide



Guerrillas—Our Hope in Red China

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South China is the most active guerrilla zone. More former government soldiers stayed behind there than elsewhere, and better contact has been maintained between the southern coastal provinces and the outside world. The people in the area have suffered heavily from indiscriminate grain seizures and heavy taxes. Land reform was poorly and inefficiently instituted by badly trained, often ruthless cadres, and this, too, has caused much resentment. The guerrillas remain active along the coast all the way through Chekiang, Kiangsu and Shantung provinces in central China, and there is considerable activity inland in Hunan, Honan, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Kweichow and Szechwan.

Manchuria, tactically a splendid guerrilla target because of its dual importance to the Chinese Reds and to Russia, has been under such tight Sino-Soviet control that some 15,000 scattered guerrillas there have not been able to do much more than stay alive.

Lieutenant General Cheng Kai-min, the swarthy, fifty-two-year-old officer who heads the Nationalist Office of Mainland Operations (*Ta Lu Kung Tso Chu*) on Taipei, summed up guerrilla operations in most of these areas as follows for me:

"Where there are hills, the guerrillas naturally use them as a base. Formerly, they swept down and held a village or a region for a certain time. Now, especially north of Yangtze but also in the south, the situation has become much more fluid and the men have to lie low for long periods of time and can only make occasional forays and attacks. Despite a shortage of demolition equipment, bridges are being destroyed and planes blown up on airfields. The railroads are well guarded and it is difficult to attack them, but there has been some destruction of rails. Highways are often hit, and junks and inland barges are being blown up frequently."

Communist Targets Blasted

In a typical action this spring, a guerrilla force attacked Kiangwan airport in Shanghai and destroyed 16 out of 28 parked fighter planes. Two ammunition dumps and various small industrial plants were also blown up in Shanghai. On the Canton-Hankow railroad, a large coal mine was exploded, and at Whampoa, near Canton, 26 drums of valuable gasoline, smuggled out of Hong Kong by the Reds, were blown up.

An account of perhaps the biggest single successful sabotage effort was related to me by an underground agent who had just returned from Shanghai. The guerrillas rented a house near a Communist armory and magazine in the city. After carefully concealing a large amount of TNT and 20 pounds of other high explosives for a month, they dug a tunnel toward their objective. One afternoon a single man, selected by lot, ignited the explosive charges and instantly blew himself up along with 100 Chinese Red workers, four Soviet technicians, 2,000 tons of explosives in the armory and about 1,000 small shacks nearby.

A chief guerrilla target everywhere has been the Communist granary. Partly to curb the guerrillas, the Reds this year began to seize all available food supplies and to store them in central granaries; families are often left with but a week's supply of rice. Whenever the guerrillas have determined that they outnumber the Communist guards, they have attacked, killed off the sentries, and distributed grain to the local people on a 60-40 basis, keeping the smaller amount for themselves. A daring public outburst took place during the First Full Moon Festival this year in a village in Hunan, when 5,000 angry peasants mobbed a granary stacked high with their wheat and burned it rather than let it be shipped north.

Such anti-Communist demonstrations on

the part of the common people are rare, but they do happen, and they demonstrate the rising wrath of China's 450,000,000 population. Another story was told me by General Chen Mu-I, commander of the Independent 35th Column of guerrillas in Chekiang and Kiangsu provinces. One cold day late last winter, in the small village of Pingyang north of Shanghai in Kiangsu, he said, 2,000 peasants armed themselves with scythes and knives and ancient farm implements. They prepared to march on a nearby concentration camp where, they had heard, 800 of their relatives imprisoned by the Communists as "unhealthy elements" were about to be slaughtered. But first the farmers of Pingyang went to the guerrillas in the surrounding hills and asked for help.

The guerrilla chief, Chu Tieh-min, planned the attack with fine precision. At three o'clock in the morning, two peasant columns approached the prison from opposite directions along the bank of a river. At the same time the guerrillas swept down from their mountain lair. The moon co-operated, neatly obscuring itself just as the camp was struck. After an hour's hand-to-hand fighting, all of the prisoners were set free.

Of the 120 Communist guards, 34 were carried off to the mountains by Chu's men and the rest were killed, many of them in their sleep, by the half-crazed, revengeful farmers with their crude iron weapons.

One of the foremost guerrilla chiefs on the mainland today is Li Mi, who has 40,000 men in Yunnan province, on the Burmese border. Li, a former Kuomintang general, reorganized his forces after the catastrophic defeat of Nationalist armies at Hsuehchow before the fall of Shanghai. On the secret orders of Chiang Kai-shek he then went to Kunming, in Yunnan, where he was promptly jailed by the traitorous governor, Lu Han. Li managed to escape and has been a thorn in the Communists' side ever since.

His continued control of the old Burma Road area is a vital factor in the guerrillas' future and in the present defense of south-east Asia.

I learned in Taipei, which has been in contact with Li's field headquarters in the southwest jungle hills, that he has been able to get some supplies smuggled up to him from Bangkok, along the remains of the old wartime road. Li himself has made trips to Bangkok and has been in touch with Formosa through the Chinese Embassy there.

While steering clear of the large Communist forces on the Indochina border, Li Mi's guerrillas have concentrated on killing Red cadres and disrupting Communist communications. This spring, on orders from Taipei, Li captured two airfields close to the Burma Road and held them for a few weeks. Taipei had hoped to send a C-47 plane over with supplies, but a hitch developed and Li was finally told to surrender the fields when the Communists moved up in strength to counterattack.

The Underground Governors

Li Mi is one of three guerrilla leaders recognized by Formosa today as "underground governors," by virtue of the fact they control a sizable area—in Li's case about a third of Yunnan. The second is Hu Lien, another ex-Kuomintang general on the mainland, who from the island of Quemoy, just off Amoy, south China's best port, directs guerrilla activities in the key province of Fukien. The Kuomintang has managed to hold Quemoy despite two strong Communist attempts to take it. The continued presence of Nationalist troops there serves the dual purpose of helping defend Formosa and the surrounding waters and of providing an advance base for guerrilla support.

The third "governor" is Yolobass (or Yelbars) Khan, a tribal leader of Sinkiang province. Yolobass leads an unknown number of Uighur and Kazakh tribesmen in the area between Tihua and Hami in this remote western area, which has been subject to strong Soviet penetration as a result of its economic wealth, including oil and uranium. Last year Yolobass reported his guerrillas fought Russian, not Chinese

Communist troops in 50 engagements, inflicting 8,000 casualties before two Soviet armored divisions supported by 50 planes drove the guerrillas into the Tianshan range.

Recently the Chinese Reds claimed the capture and execution of Yolobass' two chief lieutenants, Osman Bator and Janim Khan. The Communists in Peiping claimed their activities were sponsored by the late Douglas MacKiernan, former American consul in India, who lost his life on an epic cross-country trek to India last year. Yolobass himself, using the same route, recently turned up in Kashmir, India, and continued on to Formosa to seek more aid for his forces. Although his units have been scattered by the Soviet counter-thrusts, Yolobass told Taipei headquarters they are still capable of fighting back and pinning the opposition down if given help. Strategically located on the inner Asian frontier, Sinkiang remains a vital guerrilla zone. Its many nomadic tribes have no love for the Chinese Reds and even less for the grabbing Russians.

Around this whole western frontier fringe, the Communists still have their hands full with a variety of tribal groups and independent peoples, some of whom are in irregular contact with Formosa or Hong Kong. They include former Mohammedan troops of one-time warlord Ma Pu-fang, who took off for Mecca after the collapse of the Kuomintang and is now living in Cairo.

But a nephew of Ma's, Ma Chuan-yi, stayed behind and has created a large guerrilla force which, he recently told Chinese and American officers during a visit to Taipei, could grow to 200,000 if he had enough arms and ammunition to distribute. In Suiyuan, well-trained units who refused to follow their former leader, General Fu Tso-vi, who he defected to the Communists at the time of the fall of Peiping, are still battling the Reds; and on the Suiyuan-Ningxia border, the Mongol Prince Teh (Teh Wang), who a year ago had 60,000 horsemen mounted in six columns and in one bitter battle at Paotow smashed back the Reds, is still fighting, although recently his troops, too, have been forced further back into the hills by the Communists.

Mother Chao's Fighting Men

Szechwan Province, always independent-minded, has a hard core of guerrillas under the influence of the secret societies that have traditionally flourished there, especially the Elder Brothers. There is also an odd but effective force of some 20,000 being led by a fantastic seventy-two-year-old woman known only as "Mother Chao."

Mother Chao is a veteran guerrilla from Manchuria; her husband and two sons were killed there fighting the Japs. After the fall of Hankow, she took 100 followers, a queer mixture of ex-soldiers, fighting monks and farmers, and made the trek to Szechwan.

Kwangsi is the province where the Communist program has met the most resistance from the people. Recently, the Reds admitted that 3,000 of their cadres, mostly "progressive elements among the farmers," had been killed by the guerrillas during 1950, and several thousand others hurt. The wild Yao tribesmen of the province are a constant headache to the Communists. After several pitched battles early this year, the Yaos and other guerrillas regained control of the strategic Yao Shan areas, tall, rugged mountain country. In Taipei, I met a guerrilla who had just arrived from Kwangsi, via the northern Indochina port of Haiphong. He had established contact with the dominant Yao force of 56,000, half of whom, he told me, were armed with rifles but were desperately short of ammunition and warm clothing.

This agent was reporting in to his superior, Koh Sio-huang. Koh, a swarthy

Next Week

The EISENHOWERS At Home Abroad



Ike and Mamie are setting up house at Marnes-la-Coquette, just outside Paris. Here's a first peek inside

Thar's Gold in Them Thar HILLBILLY TUNES

Country music's booming everywhere and the Hollywood-New York slickers are making way for Nashville's best

Should the G.O.P. Merge With the DIXIECRATS?

Two prominent Republican congressmen debate a proposal that carries great significance this pre-election year

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200-pounder with several prominent gold teeth and a consequent dazzling smile, is the commander of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army in the Kwantung-Kwangsi border area. He is also the Kwantung head of one of the biggest secret societies in China, the Hungmen, or Flood-gate. Since the fall of Canton, Koh's guerrillas have been active in South China and his agents are still functioning in Canton itself, right under the noses of the Reds.

A Defeat for Koh's Forces

Koh has made his headquarters on various islands off the southern Kwantung coast, from where he has directed his guerrillas, of whom he claims 200,000—mostly concentrated in the mountainous areas bordering on Kwangsi. Until February, he held vital, tungsten-rich Nam-peng Island, with a force of 300. Then 3,000 Communists attacked him from four sides in junks and he lost two thirds of his men and a valuable radio.

But a month later Koh got partial revenge; when 2,000 Reds attacked 800 of his men in their mainland mountain stronghold, he beat them off and captured and killed their commander.

"The *lao pai-hsing* (common people) hate the Communists like hell," Koh told me. "They give us cover. When the time comes, every civilian will become a soldier."

Soon after I saw him, Koh was heading back for the mainland. He was going to slip into Hong Kong, make a deal for ammunition and guns, and, disguised as a fisherman, continue on to the nearby Portuguese colony of Macao for the same purpose. More than Hong Kong, because it is less well policed, Macao has become a guerrilla gun-running center. Then Koh was going "fishing" for a few more days, further down the coast, waiting for his men to come down from the hills to a designated rendezvous point, after which they planned to return to the hills.

The guerrilla unit belonging to Colonel Chang Hsi-ming, the woman guerrilla leader mentioned earlier, is partly based on islands no one regularly occupies, but where guerrillas put in by junk and which can be used as hide-outs and stepping stones. Colonel Chang, whose underground activity dates back to the Sino-Japanese war, has 4,000 men, split up into land and sea forces in and around Pootung, across the river from Shanghai, and up the Kiangsu coast. Her land elements, as is the case with most guerrilla units, are divided into "productive forces"—farmers, workers, small merchants and students who all afford "cover"—and armed squads of some 20 men each.

The latter mostly carry Chinese rifles but have some German 8.3-mm. guns, a few tommy guns and American revolvers, and six heavy machine guns plus a valuable pair of Czech light machine guns captured from the Communists.

"On land, we concentrate on attacking granaries, distributing grain to the people, and on killing Communist cadres," Colonel Chang told me. "But sometimes we purposely do not kill the political workers. Instead we warn them that they will be killed if they don't allow the people to keep more rice. In this way we benefit, for if a farmer is permitted to keep a month's supply instead of ten days', we get half the extra amount."

The development of Colonel Chang's sea force was the result of her outsmarting the Communists. One day last December an ordinary fishing junk she had was approached in the Yangtze estuary by a Communist gunboat. The gunboat closed in and ordered the junk to lay to for inspection. The crew waited until the Communist vessel was alongside, then quickly jumped it and with revolvers held up the unsuspecting Reds, who were manning machine guns but had no small weapons handy. The guerrillas stripped the Communist crew members and climbed into their clothes. Then, with their prisoners tied up, they sailed

back up the river. In the next few weeks, posing as Red sailors, Colonel Chang's guerrillas captured three more gunboats.

"Now many of my men are wearing Communist uniforms," Colonel Chang said, grinning.

For centuries, China's southern waters have been a happy hunting ground for pirates. During the Pacific War, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) took advantage of the pirates' keen knowledge of the area and enlisted their aid in spying on Japanese shipping, smuggling agents in and out, and in performing acts of sabotage.

Many of these pirate fleets, with no love for the Communists, who are trying to organize all junks into definite units, have recently reunited as guerrillas. Some of them are being directed by former OSS Chinese. I talked to one of these men in Hong Kong, a sallow, crafty-looking fellow, who proudly told me he used to be "agent 106" for the Americans. Now he is a leader of 17,000 guerrillas, one third of them junk-borne pirates supplying the remaining two

British pretend to close their eyes to much of what goes on but keep a careful check on political activities and let it quietly be known that while Hong Kong is still a "haven," it's not to become a free-for-all breeding ground for revolution.

Hong Kong is under the surveillance of the Communists' "Island Division." This organization, I learned, has trained some 60,000 agents to infiltrate the colony by junk—every Red junk with 10 persons aboard must include three "rookie" agents and three trained operatives. The Nationalist government, too, in recent months, particularly, has dispatched a large number of agents to Hong Kong. These include representatives of the three Nationalist leaders who are competing for control of the guerrilla movement. First, there is Lieutenant General Cheng Kai-min, the already mentioned head of the Office of Mainland Operations. Then there is Mao Jen-fang, who runs the Security Bureau (Pao Mi Chu). Mao Jen-fang's agents, I was told, have infiltrated guerrilla units to the point where

Most of these guerrillas and would-be guerrillas are desperate and broke, although some of them have been able to obtain funds from rich Chinese businessmen here who, for purely selfish reasons, have helped out the underground because they figure it may hurry their own return to the mainland and possible recovery of their properties.

Even the non-Kuomintang elements, eager as they are for direct United States aid, admit that it can't be extended independently of Formosa, given today's political realities. All they want is some assurance that they will have a proper place in any organized movement and a chance to speak their minds without fear of Kuomintang recrimination in the future. Whether Chiang Kai-shek would stick to such an agreement, if it were made the condition of further American help, is problematical, but the new large U.S. military and economic program for bolstering Formosa is certainly a lever already in our hands.

One high-ranking American official, who has had long experience in China and is thoroughly aware of the touchy problem of the Kuomintang's future, told me, after his recent return from an important policy meeting in Washington: "If we decide really to help the guerrillas, we would have to make certain that the strings are a lot tighter than they ever were before. Obviously, we couldn't follow through on each item of aid but we could pick the kind of people we wanted to train and give things to—a gun or a radio set. We could also see to it that the thousands of guerrillas who look smack over the Formosan horizon to us for help are at least not excluded. Political programs for the time being should be reduced to their simplest level, even to a few vital slogans."

Why Help from U.S. Lags

Actually, it can be reported that some secret aid to the Chinese guerrillas, mostly money, is already being extended via *sub rosa* American agencies in southeast Asia, principally in Indochina and Siam. But this has only been a drop in the bucket, and there has been no attempt to set up a central organization. Although American officials out here concerned with the guerrilla movement have unanimously recommended such a headquarters be established, no action has been taken in Washington—not, I was told, because of any apparent political fears, but simply because of old-fashioned red tape.

Again and again, these officials on the scene here have emphasized that there is not much time left. Guerrilla accounts of the increasing troubles the underground is having on the mainland bear out these warnings. For while no regime based on terror can live forever, least of all in a country so disparate and individualistic as China, it has been proved elsewhere, above all in Soviet Russia, that terror can sustain itself for generations behind a closed barrier.

Already, the Bamboo Curtain is slowly turning to iron—it's harder all the time to find out what's really happening in China. An American intelligence officer here believes that "in another three months, it may be too late to help the guerrillas."

He added: "If we had done something about it sooner, we might have pinned down many of the troops the Communists sent to Korea. If we help even now, we could still cause Mao Tse-tung a peck of trouble and create a no man's land to our advantage between South China and southeast Asia."

Echoing these remarks, one guerrilla I met in Hong Kong, who had just arrived from the mainland with fresh stories corroborating the stepped-up terror, said: "The guerrillas have not yet lost hope, but they are becoming discouraged. They all look to America to save them. As for myself, if I only knew help was coming, even a cent's worth, I'd be willing to die for the next generation in China."

THE END



thirds on the coast north of Hong Kong with food and other supplies, including dynamite.

The guerrillas are using the dynamite to blow up flat-bottom inland barges and coastal junks. This serves the dual purpose of depriving the Communists of them and affording the guerrillas some additional supplies—mostly grain.

The pirate contingents also conduct raids on motor junks at sea, and being opportunists, as well as anti-Communists, they get funds by acting as couriers, for stiff commissions, for rich Chinese living in southeast Asia who want to smuggle money in to their relatives in China.

Just "Fishing"—and Waiting

The man I talked to told me: "I have another 700 men of my own who all worked with the Americans before. They're experts at laying magnetic mines. Now they're just hanging around and 'fishing,' waiting for something to happen."

Hong Kong today is full of people who are "hanging around," waiting for the millennium. It's the new Casablanca, with its own traditional Oriental overtones. There may well be more spies per square foot here than anywhere in the world. Chiefly the colony plays host to Kuomintang and Communist agents, who spy on each other, on the British and on the Americans. The

they dominate two thirds of the pro-Kuomintang underground and are increasingly seeking to extend their influence over other guerrilla groups.

Their method is to hand out subtle warnings to the effect that anyone not actively pro Kuomintang as well as anti-Communist faces a dim future "when Chiang Kai-shek returns to the mainland." In the opinion of many persons concerned over the guerrillas' future, Mao Jen-fang's men have become a divisive force which can only be countered by a Sino-American agency with no partisan political ax to grind.

The third man may turn out eventually to be the real boss of the guerrillas. He is Major General Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son, by a first marriage, of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Only forty-five, Chiang Ching-kuo is head of the political department of the Ministry of National Defense. His chief current job is to indoctrinate the 500,000 Kuomintang troops on Formosa. But he has set his cap on control of the guerrillas as one means to establish himself as his father's eventual heir.

Representatives of these three men—Cheng Kai-min, Mao Jen-fang and Chiang Ching-kuo—have one thing in common: they are all seeking, in Hong Kong, to wean away the guerrillas who have so far refused to throw in their lot with the Nationalists and who have preferred to sit it out and hope for independent aid from America.

How Seen
on Stalin.

By S. Sidney Bromberg.

The notion that the bombing of Communist supply bases in Manchuria or the participation of the Chinese anti-Communist forces on Formosa would bring into the Korean war the Russian Soviet armies because of some treaty obligations to Communist China, has been discredited by Winston Churchill, James F. Byrnes and Gen. MacArthur—men who have had prolonged dealings with the Soviet regime.

Stalin repudiated dozens of treaty obligations in the past. He does supply Communist China and North Korea with most of their ammunition, tanks, jet planes, but refrains from sending his own troops for his own good reasons. They are the same reasons which prevented him from sending troops into Greece, where Greek Communist guerrillas, instead of having been defeated, could have been victorious with even small help from one or two Soviet divisions, thus opening to Stalin the long-cherished egress into the Mediterranean.

But Stalin well remembers how his disorganized troops kept retreating and seeking ways to surrender when Hitler's army moved into Russia in 1941. By the time Stalin's armies had retreated to Stalingrad, 3,600,000 of the Soviet soldiers had given themselves up as prisoners of war and more than 400,000 of them donned the German army uniform, according to the Nazi secret documents uncovered by the United States occupational authorities in Germany. This is a striking indication of the hatred the Russian people harbor for the brutal dictator Stalin and his stooges.

Hitler's insane race-extinction policies eventually convinced the Russians that they must fight the invading Nazis for their personal and national preservation. The U.S. lend-lease arms and food helped the Russians to do so in the hope that under the prodding of their Western allies, Stalin would change his brutal regime.

The disillusioned Russians are not likely to miss their second chance to destroy the Communist system of slavery in case of another war, through sabotage, desertion, or outright revolution. And Stalin knows it.

That's why he will continue his aggressive ventures in Korea and elsewhere only to the extent that he can induce the Chinese, Koreans or other Asian peoples to fight for him because of their lack of experience with the false and deceitful promises of the Communists.

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